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I. INTRODUCTION
In the late 1980s, after developing a new drug, Bayer obtained a patent and
1
marketed the product for up to $5.30/pill under the brand name Ciprofloxacin
2
(Cipro). Perceiving the patent to be invalid, competing producers developed a
3
4
generic bio-equivalent of the drug to market for as little as $1.10/pill. Our
society thrives on competition, and the generic challenge to Bayer will be widely
5
viewed as positive for consumers. Many would be surprised to learn, therefore,
6
that the generic producer (Barr) abandoned its effort to market the drug in
7
exchange for annual payments from Bayer amounting to nearly $400 million.
Indeed, Bayer retained its monopoly, sidestepping a potentially serious challenge
8
to its patent, and Barr received hefty annual payments greater than the amount it
9
stood to make by selling its drug. The challenge left consumers paying a

* J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2015; B.A.,
History, Seattle University, 2012. Special thanks to Professor Kojo Yelpaala, who showed only the finest
loyalty in assisting with the development of this Comment.
1. Brand name drugs are usually innovative pharmaceuticals containing newly developed, patented
substances. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 2
(2009) [hereinafter INDUSTRY ANTITRUST HANDBOOK].
2. Letter Brief of California Attorney General as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3, In re Cipro
Cases I & II, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165 (Ct. App. 2011) (No. S198616) [hereinafter Letter Brief of Attorney
General].
3. In re Cipro Cases I & II, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165, 170–171 (Ct. App. 2011). Generic drugs are those that
contain the same active ingredient as brand name drugs. INDUSTRY ANTITRUST HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 5–
6. In order to qualify as a generic, a drug must be the “bio-equivalent” of a brand name drug. See 21 C.F.R. §
320.1(e) (2009) (defining bio-equivalent as “the absence of a significant difference in the rate and extent to
which the active ingredient or active moiety in pharmaceutical equivalents or pharmaceutical alternatives
becomes available at the site of drug action when administered at the same molar dose under similar conditions
in an appropriately designed study.”).
4. Letter Brief of Attorney General, supra note 2, at 3; see also FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PAY-FORDELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS 8 (2010), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/reporter/competition/ payfordelay.shtml [hereinafter FTC REVERSE-PAYMENT STUDY]
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (indicating that the cost of generics are commonly lower, on average
85% less than the price of brand name equivalents).
5. See FTC REVERSE-PAYMENT STUDY, supra note 4, at 1 (indicating that consumers suffer when forced
to pay for brand name drugs when generics may cost as little as 10% as much) . Challenges by generic
producers often succeed, with brand patents being held invalid in 73% of Hatch-Waxman litigation from 1992
through June 2002. Id at 3.
6. Two other drug producers later joined Barr in challenging Bayer’s patent, agreeing to share the cost of
litigation in exchange for an agreement to jointly produce the generic, while sharing the profits. In re Cipro
Cases I & II, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 171.
7. See id. at 171 (“By December 2003 when Bayer ceased making payments, its payments to Barr totaled
approximately $398 million . . . ,”).
8. Brief of Appellants at 1, In re Cipro Cases I & II, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165 (Ct. App. 2011) (No.
D056361) [hereinafter Brief of Appellants].
9. The court found that the amount of money received from Bayer “was more than double the $148
million to $177 million Barr predicted it would earn selling generic ciprofloxacin in a competitive market . . . .”
Id. at 1–2.
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premium on the drug, purchasing Bayer-manufactured Cipro at four times the
10
cost of a generic alternative.
Competition from manufacturers of generic drugs is a critical tool in
11
controlling the cost of medications, which have skyrocketed in recent years. In
fact, consumers nearly always save money when purchasing generic
12
medications. The savings are especially prominent for the underprivileged and
13
those without health insurance. Recognizing this savings potential, Congress
streamlined the procedures for generic market entry in 1984 with the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act. Known as the Hatch-Waxman
Act, this legislation incentivizes the makers of generic drugs to challenge
14
potentially invalid patents held by brand name drug manufacturers. Agreements
between brand name and generic drug makers stymie the development of a
competitive market and work against the legislative framework that regulates that
15
16
market. Such agreements also present a serious threat to drug innovation. As
former FTC Commissioner Jon Leibowitz testified, “the incentive to pay a
17
generic to abandon its patent challenge is greatest for the weakest patents.” That

10. Letter Brief of Attorney General, supra note 2, at 3. In fact, shortly after securing the reverse-payment
agreements at issue, Bayer increased the cost of Cipro by 16%. Brief of Appellants, supra note 8, at 2.
11. See INDUSTRY ANTITRUST HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 1 (noting that prescription drug spending has
grown at double the rate of total health spending); Letter Brief of Attorney General, supra note 2, at 2 (detailing
the increase of pharmaceutical costs in California); see also Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC
Study: In FY 2012, Branded Drug Firms Significantly Increased the Use of Potential Pay-for-Delay Settlements
to Keep Generic Competitors off the Market (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2013/01/mmarpt.shtm (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“Generic drugs are the key to making medicines affordable for millions
of American consumers, and help hold down costs for taxpayer-funded health programs such as Medicare and
Medicaid.”).
12. On average, the price of a generic medication is 85% less than the cost of its brand name equivalent,
and the savings are such that generic medications typically achieve a 90% share of the market within a year of
their entry. FTC REVERSE-PAYMENT STUDY, supra note 4, at 8.
13. See JON LEIBOWITZ, CHAIRMAN, FED. TRADE COMM’N, “PAY-FOR-DELAY” SETTLEMENTS IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: HOW CONGRESS CAN STOP ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT, PROTECT
CONSUMERS’ WALLETS, AND HELP PAY FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM (THE $35 BILLION SOLUTION) 3–4 (June
23, 2009) (hereinafter Leibowitz).
(“Those of us with the good fortune to have health insurance don’t see these cost differences directly
because we only pay the difference between the brand and the generic copay—the rest of the
additional cost is hidden in our health insurance premium. But if you are one of the 46 million
uninsured in this country . . . it’s an entirely different story. . . . And it’s not just a matter of
economics: high prescription drug prices often cause patients to cut their pills in half or skip needed
medications altogether.”).
14. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012) (allowing generic producers to make themselves eligible for
certain market exclusivity periods by filing an ANDA IV application).
15. See Brief Amici Curiae of 118 Law, Economics, and Business Professors and the American Antitrust
Institute in Support of Petitioners at 9, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL
391001 [hereinafter Brief of Law, Economics, and Business Professors] (expressing the dismay of the framers
of the legislation, Representative Henry Waxman and Senator Orrin Hatch, to reverse-payment settlements,
which Senator Hatch finds “appalling”).
16. Leibowitz, supra note 13, at 6.
17. Id. Leibowitz also noted that “[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that protecting weak
patents slows rather than promotes innovation.” Id.
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these agreements contain large payouts in exchange for a delay in competition
18
raises serious antitrust considerations.
At the federal level, the Supreme Court recognized such implications by
reversing the Circuit Court trend and subjecting reverse-payment settlements to
19
antitrust scrutiny under the Sherman Act. Nevertheless, the Court’s holding fails
20
to protect consumers from anticompetitive agreements. The more relaxed ruleof-reason analysis, which the Supreme Court adopted in FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,
21
does not explicitly condemn reverse-payment settlements. This analysis
threatens the government’s ability to ensure properly competitive markets for
drugs because it diverts government resources toward litigating against plainly
22
anticompetitive agreements. This Comment argues that the more proper
antitrust analysis for reverse-payment agreements is the per se rule, or, in the
alternative, the quick-look approach.
Although persuasive, Sherman Act case law is not controlling under
23
California’s own antitrust law—the Cartwright Act. Estimated to cost
Californians $4.2 billion in higher prescription drug costs over the next ten years,
the prevalence of reverse-payment settlements is a matter deserving of serious
24
public attention within the state. Indeed, the California Attorney General
believes that reverse-payment settlements should be categorized as per se
violations of the act, an interpretation the California Supreme Court should
25
endorse in lieu of the Actavis decision. Reverse-payment settlements are facially
anticompetitive agreements that result in significant costs to the consumer;
declaring these agreements to be per se violations of the Cartwright Act would
best promote consumer welfare. Should the court reject the per se rule, a

18. See In re Cipro Cases I & II, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165, 174 (Ct. App. 2011) (describing the plaintiffs
allegation that reverse-payment settlements raise triable issues of violation of the Cartwright Act and arguing
for a per se bar on the agreements).
19. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013). The Court’s holding subjects reverse-payment
settlements to greater scrutiny than the Eleventh Circuit, which stated that a settlement should be “immune from
antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the
patent.” Id.
20. See infra Part IX, (advocating the application of the per se rule to reverse-payment agreements in the
interest of consumer welfare).
21. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237. The Court argued that “the FTC must prove its case” to the district courts
in challenging reverse-payment settlements. Id.
22. See Leibowitz, supra note 13, at 5 (indicating that the FTC continues to initiate litigation against
producers who enter into reverse-payment agreements, but that such litigation is “time consuming and
expensive”).
23. See Coordination Proceeding Cipro Cases I & II, No. JCCP4154, 2009 WL 2700124, (Cal. Super. Ct.
Aug. 21, 2009) (“[T]he Court recognizes that the federal decisional law is not binding on this Court . . . .”); see
Part IV.A. for a discussion of the relevance of federal Sherman Act interpretation.
24. Letter Brief of Attorney General, supra note 2, at 3.
25. Id.; see also Brief of Appellants, supra note 8, at 43 (“[T]he California Attorney General has
consistently denounced them as unlawful.”).
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truncated rule of reason (quick-look) approach would better serve the interests of
26
reverse-payment litigation than a traditional rule-of-reason approach.
Part II of this article discusses the Hatch-Waxman Act: the legal framework
under which reverse-payment settlements arise. Part III then describes the efforts
to litigate against reverse-payment deals. Part IV details the competing standards
of review that courts may apply in antitrust challenges. Part V analyzes the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of reverse-payment agreements under the
Sherman Act in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. Part VI discusses the reasoning of California
lower courts in Cartwright Act challenges. Then, Part VII discusses the role of
patents in antitrust litigation. Part VIII argues that recent interpretation of
reverse-payment settlements under federal law should change present Cartwright
Act interpretation. Part IX asserts that application of the per se rule is most
appropriate for Cartwright Act scrutiny. However, should the California Supreme
Court decline to adopt the per se rule, Part X suggests that it should employ a
quick-look analysis.
II. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
Since 1938, every drug seeking market entry in the United States must gain
FDA approval certifying its safety and effectiveness by filing a New Drug
27
Application (NDA). The approval process mandates extensive testing to
28
determine the safety of drugs containing newly-created active ingredients. The
Hatch-Waxman Act eases the burden of market entry for generic medications,
allowing drug producers using an active ingredient identical to a drug already on
29
the market to file an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA). The ANDA
30
relies on the application and testing encompassed in the initial NDA. By
allowing generic producers to rely on the brand name drug’s application, the

26. For a review of the truncated rule-of-reason approach, see infra Part IV.C. Among the most critical
aspects of the approach is that it shifts the burden to the defendants to prove pro-competitive effects, rather than
requiring plaintiffs to prove anti-competitive effects. Geoffrey D. Oliver, Of Tenors, Real Estate Brokers And
Golf Clubs: A Quick Look at Truncated Rule of Reason Analysis, ANTITRUST MAGAZINE, Spring 2010, at 40.
27. New Drug Application (NDA), U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (last updated Feb. 21, 2013),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/
ApprovalApplications/NewDrugApplicationNDA/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
28. Id. Labeling and manufacturing processes of drugs are also reviewed in the initial NDA. Id.
29. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2) (2012). Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, producers of generic medications were
required to undertake their own extensive testing, even though the drug was presumably identical to one already
approved by the FDA. See Brief of Law, Economics, and Business Professors, supra note 15, at 7 (“The first
tool the legislature created to accelerate generic entry was the Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”)
process that allowed generic firms to rely on the brand drug’s safety and effectiveness studies and avoid the
expensive and lengthy new-drug-application process.”).
30. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i) (dictating that an ANDA shall contain “information to show that the
conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling proposed for the new drug have been
previously approved for a [listed] drug . . . .”).
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Hatch-Waxman Act directly incentivizes producers of generic medications to
31
seek market entry by easing the cost of doing so.
In addition to encouraging generic market entry, the Hatch-Waxman Act
specifically encourages generics to challenge potentially invalid patents held by
32
brand name drug manufacturers. While four certification options are available
33
to a generic manufacturer filing an ANDA, only one of these—challenging the
validity of an existing patent—rewards successful generic applicants with a 18034
day sales exclusivity grant. The Hatch-Waxman Act also limits potential
generic liability in patent-infringement litigation to the cost of that litigation by
35
providing an affirmative defense, freeing generic producers from the need to be
36
overly cautious in challenging patents.
Reverse-payment settlements challenge the framework laid down by the
37
Hatch-Waxman Act. They are a phenomenon unique to the pharmaceutical
38
industry, arising between producers of generic and brand name medications.
These settlements arise under a law specifically enacted to counter a pervasive,
39
industry-wide lack of competition from generic medications. They are clearly
40
an unforeseen effect of that law. At the time of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s
passage, 150 brand name medications had expired patents and yet none faced
41
competition from generic brands. Agreements between producers that restrict
generic market entry therefore directly contravene the intent of the Hatch42
Waxman Act.

31. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984) (“The purpose of . . . the bill is to make available more
low cost generic drugs . . . .”).
32. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (granting the first filing drug a 180-day period of exclusivity
upon successful challenge of patent); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (establishing an “experimental use defense” to
immunize generic producers from patent infringement suits that result from Hatch-Waxman challenges).
33. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(IV) (allowing the producer of a generic medication to certify
that (1) no patent exists, (2) the patent has expired, (3) the patent will soon expire, or (4) the patent is invalid).
34. See id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (conditioning the grant of a 180-day exclusivity period to certifications
made pursuant to § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV)).
35. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857 at 15.
36. See id. at 45. The defense protects producers from patent infringement liability for experimentation
“reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a federal law . . . .” Id. The move
came in response to an unfavorable holding by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Id.
37. See Brief of Law, Economics, and Business Professors, supra note 15, at 9 (“Representative Waxman
explained that such agreements ‘turn[] the . . . legislation on [its] head.’”).
38. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013) (explaining that “[a]pparently most if not all
reverse-payment settlement agreements arise in the context of pharmaceutical drug regulation . . . .”).
39. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857 at 16–17 (indicating that “there are approximately 150 drugs approved
after 1962 that are off patent and for which there is no generic equivalent” while describing the need for
legislation).
40. See Brief of Law, Economics, and Business Professors, supra note 15, at 9 (expressing the dismay of
the framers of the legislation, Representative Henry Waxman and Senator Orrin Hatch, to reverse-payment
settlements, which Senator Hatch finds “appalling”).
41. Id. at 6.
42. The Hatch-Waxman Act clearly endeavored to expand the availability of generic medications, not
permit their restriction. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857 at 14) (“The purpose of . . . the bill is to make available more
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III. THE LEGAL CHALLENGES TO REVERSE-PAYMENT AGREEMENTS
Reverse-payment settlements do more than contravene the intent of the
43
Hatch-Waxman Act—they directly undermine its effectiveness. The 180-day
44
exclusivity period is available only to the generic manufacturer who files first,
so producers of brand name drugs may “bottleneck” further generic entry by
45
entering into a reverse-payment agreement with the first filer. Brand name
producers can effectively disincentivize future challenges to their patents by
46
settling with a single generic producer. Although the Hatch-Waxman Act aims
47
to “make available more low cost generic drugs,” reverse-payment settlements
48
threaten its framework and undermine pharmaceutical competition.
Recognizing the implications of reverse-payment agreements, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) began a substantial effort to pursue antitrust claims
49
against parties to these agreements in the early 2000s. Recognition of the
growing use of reverse-payment agreements also led to provisions in the
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 that
50
required parties to notify the FTC of settlements under the Hatch-Waxman Act.
Despite the reporting requirements, however, manufacturers continue to enter
into reverse-payment agreements: in fiscal year 2012 the total number of
51
agreements increased to a record 40, costing consumers an estimated $3.5
52
billion annually.
Going forward, the FTC will continue to pursue antitrust claims against
53
parties to reverse-payment agreements. As Chairwoman Edith Ramirez
low cost generic drugs . . . .”).
43. FTC REVERSE-PAYMENT STUDY, supra note 4, at 2 (“Pay-for-delay agreements have significantly
postponed substantial consumer savings from lower generic drug prices.”).
44. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). First-filing producers of generic medications must either have marketed
their product for 180 days or forfeit the right before subsequent-filing generic producers may market their
product. Id. at § 355(j)(5)(D).
45. FTC REVERSE-PAYMENT STUDY, supra note 4, at 5 (“This cork-in-the-bottle effect occurs because
every subsequent generic entrant has to wait until the first generic has been marketed for 180 days.”).
46. Id.
47. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984).
48. See Leibowitz, supra note 13, at 1 (describing the Hatch-Waxman Act as being “distorted” by
pharmaceutical companies entering into reverse-payment agreements).
49. See id. at 4 (“That is why the Commission has made stopping these deals a top priority. Initially,
under the leadership of both Democrat Bob Pitofsky and Republican Tim Muris, when the Commission found
drug companies engaging in pay-for-delay settlements, we stopped them cold.”).
50. BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE
MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003 2 (2012).
51. FTC REVERSE-PAYMENT STUDY, supra note 4, at 3.
52. Id. at 2; BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003 2 (2012). (see
suggestion for splitting this cite in comment bubble above).
53. See Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, Before the United States Senate
Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights on Pay-forDelay Deals: Limiting Competition and Costing Consumers, 113th Cong. 12 (2013) [hereinafter FTC
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remarked, “[a] single anticompetitive agreement can easily increase prescription
54
drug costs by many millions of dollars . . . .” This detrimental impact on
consumers—who pay up to 90% higher costs for drugs—results in bipartisan
55
support from commission members to bring antitrust claims.
IV. STANDARDS OF ANTITRUST REVIEW
Antitrust standards of review determine the level of inquiry a court will
56
undertake in evaluating an agreement. While understanding the difference
between the rule of reason and the per se rule is not difficult, determining their
57
proper application is often an uncertain endeavor.
A. The Rule of Reason
The broad language of the Sherman Act is readily apparent: it categorically
58
voids all restraints of trade. Thus the rule of reason is a significant development
in Supreme Court interpretation because it looks past the exact language of the
59
text itself. The Court first announced the rule in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey
v. United States, stating that the Sherman Act’s restraint-of-trade language draws
60
on the common law—prohibiting only unreasonable restraints of trade. Justice
Brandeis offered necessary clarification to the Standard Oil rule in Board of
Trade of Chicago v. United States, noting:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it
is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. . . . [T]he court
must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the

Statement] (statement of Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n) (“[T]he Commission will continue
to aggressively prosecute these anticompetitive settlements.”).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2 (“Since this issue first arose in 1998, every single member of the Commission, past and
present—whether Democrat, Republican, or Independent—has supported the Commission’s challenges to these
agreements.”)
56. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE 255 (3d ed. 2005) (“The difference between a “per se” and a “rule of reason” standard lies in how
much we need to know before we can make [a] decision.”); see also id. at 257 (depending upon the standard of
review, the court may “inquir[e] into the market structure or the market power of those engaged in the practice”
or limit “certain justifications or defenses”).
57. See id. at 257 “[T]he most difficult aspect of the jurisprudence of the per se rule is determining when
it should be followed.”
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
59. Originally following the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890, the Court consistently considered the
extent of Section 1, which posits that “[e]very contract . . . in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to
be illegal.” Id. After declining to amend the extent of the Act several times, the Court held that only
unreasonable restraints of trade are illegal. Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911).
60. Id.
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restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was
imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The
history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting
the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
61
relevant facts.
The rule of reason therefore inquires into the context and circumstances
surrounding an agreement and considers potential pro-competitive justifications
62
that a party might offer. The nature, depth, and detail of that inquiry varies
63
depending on the subject of the court’s scrutiny. Generally speaking, only those
facts that are relevant—those tending to show or counter the presence of
64
anticompetitive conduct—will be considered in a rule of reason case. One
cannot quickly dismiss an agreement when conducting a rule-of-reason analysis
without examining the relevant market conditions and pro-competitive
65
justifications offered.
B. The Per Se Rule
The development of the rule of reason reflects the evolution of the Court’s
Sherman Act interpretation: this reasoning avoids a literal reading that might
66
restrict every restraint of trade. However, the Court has also recognized that a
reasonableness standard is not always appropriate when evaluating conduct that
67
will consistently violate antitrust laws. In United States v. Trenton Potteries
Co., the Court rejected an effort to assess the reasonableness of a naked price68
fixing agreement, noting their long history of condemnation of such agreements.
The Court remarked:
The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the
elimination of one form of competition. . . . Agreements which create
such potential power may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable

61. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
62. The amount of inquiry will vary with the circumstances, and only relevant facts and information are
necessary. “What is required . . . is an enquiry meet for the case, looking to the circumstances, details, and logic
of a restraint.” Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999).
63. HOVENKAMP, supra note 56, at 255; see also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad., 441 U.S. 1, 6
(1979) (“[E]asy labels do not always supply ready answers.”); Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 779 (“The truth is
that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are less fixed than terms like ‘per se,’ ‘quick look,’ and
‘rule of reason’ tend to make them appear.”).
64. HOVENKAMP, supra note 56, at 256.
65. See Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 780 (“[T]he quality of proof required should vary with the
circumstances.”).
66. United States v. Trenton Potteries, Inc., 273 U.S. 392, 395 (1927).
67. Id.at 397.
68. Id.
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or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry whether a
69
particular price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed . . . .
The per se rule grants less judicial deference than its conceptual
70
counterpart. The application of the per se rule suggests that little information
about an agreement is necessary for a court to invalidate it; the rule presupposes
71
with certainty that anticompetitive harm will result. In United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., the Court asserted:
Any combination which tampers with price structures is engaged in an
unlawful activity. Even though members of the price-fixing group were
in no position to control the market, to the extent that they raised,
lowered, or stabilized prices they would be directly interfering with the
72
free play of market forces.
Distinguishing the effect of the per se rule from the rule of reason is not a
73
challenging task; however, identifying the proper application is quite difficult.
In NCAA v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, the Court stated that the
threshold question was whether “the practice facially appears to be one that
would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease
74
output.” Once a particular type of agreement has been condemned as
anticompetitive and subjected to the per se rule, future courts may invalidate
similar agreements with little regard for the circumstances in which they are
75
created.
C. The Quick-Look Approach
The traditional approaches to antitrust scrutiny stand in stark contrast to each
other: one contemplates inquiry into the circumstances of an agreement while the
76
other invalidates with little consideration. Beginning in the late 20th century,

69. Id.
70. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. 468 U.S. 85, 103–104 (1984) (“Per se rules are
invoked when surrounding circumstances make the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct so great as to render
unjustified further examination of the challenged conduct.”).
71. Id.
72. 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940).
73. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 56, at 257 (“[T]he most difficult aspect of the jurisprudence of the per
se rule is determining when it should be followed.”).
74. 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984) (citing Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979)).
75. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607–608 (1972) (“It is only after considerable
experience with certain business relationships that courts classify them as per se violations of the Sherman
Act.”).
76. Oliver, supra note 26, at 40 (“This dichotomy remained generally accepted throughout most of the
20th century. It proved to be a pragmatic approach that permitted courts to balance the desire to condemn
quickly and efficiently those practices without redeeming value against the benefit of more careful
consideration of practices . . . less well understood.”).
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the Supreme Court fostered consideration of an additional standard of review for
77
antitrust cases: the abbreviated rule-of-reason (quick-look) approach. The
quick-look approach is designed to ease the burden of employing a full rule-ofreason analysis for agreements that are commonly, though not always,
78
anticompetitive.
The quick-look approach shifts the burden of proving that an agreement is
79
anticompetitive away from the plaintiffs. Instead, the court requires the
defendant to affirmatively demonstrate the pro-competitive nature of an
80
agreement. This burden shift is appropriate for agreements deemed “inherently
81
suspect,” but not so anticompetitive as to deserve per se invalidation. The Court
suggests that the quick-look approach is properly applied when “an observer with
even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the
arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and
82
markets.”
While the quick-look approach has gained favor with the FTC in its own
83
84
administrative decisions, the Court has applied it relatively infrequently. The
Court employed the quick-look approach in a number of decisions in the late
20th century, which eroded the traditional distinction between the rule of reason
85
and the per se rule. Since then, however, lower courts have been skeptical of the
86
quick-look approach. More recently, the Court declined the FTC’s suggestion to
87
adopt the quick-look approach in the Actavis decision.

77. Id.
78. Id. at 42 (“The purpose, said the Court, is ‘to see whether the experience of the market has been so
clear . . . that a confident conclusion about the principal tendency of a restriction will follow’ from a quick
look.”) (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999)).
79. Id. at 40 (“[A] truncated analysis permits the plaintiff to satisfy its initial burden of production
without presenting evidence that the defendant’s challenged conduct caused or is likely to cause actual harm to
competition.”).
80. Id. (“The burden of production . . . shifts to the defendant to rebut the plaintiff’s showing. It may do
so by demonstrating that the restraint has a plausible procompetitive justification. If the defendant does so, a full
rule of reason analysis must be undertaken”).
81. See e.g. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ, of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100–101 (1984). The Court dealt
with suspect broadcasting restrictions. Id. at 91–94. It refused to apply the per se rule, but nevertheless limited
the inquiry by hearing some pro-competitive justifications for the restrictions proffered by the NCAA. Id. at
100. However, it ultimately rejected those justifications and remanded the case without the need for further
analysis. Id. at 120.
82. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
83. See, e.g., Realcomp II, Ltd., FTC Docket No. 9320, Op. of the Comm’n (Oct. 30, 2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9320/091102realcompopinion.pdf. (analyzing the matter under all three
standards of review and extensively exploring the Court’s quick-look jurisprudence, including the Cal. Dental
Ass’n decision)
84. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 771 (“The case before us, however, fails to present a situation
in which the likelihood of anticompetitive effects is comparably obvious.”).
85. Oliver, supra note 26, at 40–41.
86. Id. at 41.
(“Abbreviated rule of reason analysis has received a mixed reception in lower courts. Generally,
U.S. courts of appeal have acknowledged that a quick look analysis permits condemnation of certain
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V. REVERSE-PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT: FTC V.
ACTAVIS, INC.
Prompted by years of uncertainty and varying Circuit Court interpretations,
88
the Supreme Court finally addressed reverse-payment settlements in 2013. In
89
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., the Court held that parties could challenge reverse90
payment settlements under the Sherman Act using a rule-of-reason analysis.
The Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s position that reverse-payment
settlements are valid so long as they do not fall outside of a patent’s exclusionary
91
scope. Under the circuit court’s reasoning, the payment at issue was valid
92
because it did not restrict competition any more than a patent could. In rejecting
this “exclusionary potential” test, the Supreme Court clearly endorsed the
93
application of antitrust principles to reverse-payment settlements. Merely
applying patent law principles to the settlements would not address the potential
94
for consumer detriment that implicates antitrust concerns. The Court recognized
the deficiency of the exclusionary potential test when it remarked that “there is
reason for concern that settlements taking this form tend to have significant
95
adverse effects on competition.”
In holding that antitrust analysis is an appropriate framework for review of
reverse-payment settlements, the Court noted that such review should proceed
96
under the rule-of-reason analysis. The Court suggested that the payments might
97
sometimes be justified as traditional settlement considerations. Such

practices without extensive evidence of actual anticompetitive effects but sometimes have been
reluctant to apply an abbreviated analysis to the specific cases before them.”).
87. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013) (“The FTC urges us to hold that reverse
payment settlement agreements are presumptively unlawful and that courts reviewing such agreements should
proceed via a ‘quick look’ approach, rather than applying a ‘rule of reason.’ . . . We decline to do so.”).
88. Id. at 2227.
89. The facts of the case mirror that of typical of reverse-payment agreements. Solvay Pharmaceuticals
filed an NDA for Androgel in 1999. Id. at 2229. Shortly after obtaining a patent in 2003, Actavis, Inc. (formerly
Watson Pharmaceuticals) filed an ANDA challenging the validity of Solvay’s patent. Id. That ANDA was
followed by applications from three more generic producers. Id. During the ensuing Hatch-Waxman litigation,
Solvay settled with the producers by providing lump-sum and annual payments in exchange for withdrawal of
their generic alternatives to Androgel. Id.
90. Id. at 2237. The FTC had urged the Court to adopt a quick-look approach to the agreements. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2230 (“Solvay’s patent, if valid and infringed, might have permitted it to charge drug prices
sufficient to recoup the reverse settlement payments it agreed to make to its potential generic competitors.”).
93. Id. at 2232 (“For another thing, this Court’s precedents make clear that patent-related settlement
agreements can sometimes violate the antitrust laws.”).
94. See Id. at 2231 (“[P]atent and antitrust policies are both relevant in determining the ‘scope of the
patent monopoly’—and consequently antitrust law immunity—that is conferred by a patent.”) (emphasis
added).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2237.
97. “The reverse payment, for example, may amount to no more than a rough approximation of the
litigation expenses saved through the settlement.” Id. at 2236. In addition to avoided litigation costs, the Court
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considerations, like avoided litigation costs, arguably would not serve the
purpose of buying off generic market entry and thereby not implicate antitrust
98
concerns. The FTC had urged the court to adopt a more stringent approach to
reverse-payment settlements, shifting the burden to the defendants to justify
99
payments. The Court rejected that theory, reasoning that the settlements might
100
serve valid purposes.
VI. REVERSE-PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS IN CALIFORNIA: CARTWRIGHT ACT
CHALLENGES
Like many states, California has its own antitrust statute that supplements the
101
federal Sherman Act. This section discusses that statute—the Cartwright Act—
including the relevance of federal Sherman Act decisions.It also discusses the
primary reverse-payment challenge arising under the Cartwright Act.
A. The Cartwright Act Distinguished
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in FTC v. Actavis, Inc., alongside
underlying circuit court opinions, interpreted the legality of reverse-payment
102
settlements under the Sherman Act. In California, the Cartwright Act has been
103
the primary state antitrust statute for a century. Passed in 1907, the Cartwright
104
Act resembles other state antitrust statutes under consideration at the time.
While the exact legislative history and intent of the Act is debated, the breadth of

suggests the payments might “reflect fair value for services” rendered. Id.
98. Id. at 2237.
99. Id.; see HOVENKAMP, supra note 56, at 265–266 (“The [quick-look] inquiry is usually best reserved
for circumstances where the restraint is sufficiently threatening to place it presumptively in the per se class, but
lack of judicial experience requires at least some consideration of proffered defenses or justifications.”).
100. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236–27. The Court did not give much consideration to other potential
justifications for the agreements. However, Justice Breyer acknowledged “[w]here a reverse payment reflects
traditional settlement considerations, such as avoided litigation costs or fair value for services, there is not the
same concern that a patentee is using its monopoly profits to avoid the risk of patent invalidation or a finding of
noninfringement.” Id. at 2236.
101. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16720 (West 2008).
102. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227.
103. Don T. Hibner, Jr. & Heather M. Cooper, The Cartwright Act at 100 – A History of Complementary
Antitrust EnforcementCA Celebration, 17 J. OF ANTITRUST AND UNFAIR COMPETITION L. SEC. OF ST. B. OF
CAL. 81, 81 (2008).
104. See id. at 90–92 (describing a number of similar state antitrust statutes). The exact history of the
Cartwright Act is unclear, with other earlier state statutes potentially serving as models for the Act. Id. at 93.
For example, the state of Ohio enacted the Valentine Act in 1898. 13 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331
(LexisNexis 2006). The Valentine Act prohibits a trust that exists for any unlawful purpose. Id. at § 1331.01(B).
Among these restricted purposes is “[t]o create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce.” Id. at §
1331.01(B)(1). This language is identical to the Cartwright Act, which reads “[t]o create or carry out restrictions
in trade or commerce.” BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16720(a). Other states with similar laws include Texas and
Michigan. See Hibner & Cooper, supra note 103, at 93.

671

2014 / Ending Reverse-Payment Immunity
105

its application is indisputable. The Act prohibits any “combination of capital,
106
skill or acts by two or more persons” to further an improper purpose.
Federal decisional law interpreting the Sherman Act does not bind the
107
Cartwright Act because the latter is a separate and distinct state statute. Given
their similarities, it is not surprising that courts in California treat the
108
jurisprudence behind the Sherman Act as persuasive authority. Yet the two
remain invariably distinct, with the California Supreme Court going so far as to
broaden antitrust regulation in California beyond the purview of the Sherman
109
Act.
B. Reverse-Payment Challenges Under the Cartwright Act
The primary Cartwright Act challenge to reverse-payment settlements
developed following an agreement between brand name producer Bayer and
110
generic producer Barr concerning the drug Cipro. Within months of Bayer’s
patent filing for Cipro, Barr filed an ANDA that challenged the patent as
111
invalid. Following the procedures required by the Hatch-Waxman Act, Bayer
112
filed suit to resolve the validity of the patent. Barr’s case against Bayer
appeared likely to succeed due to evidence of bad faith in the patent filing
113
process. Indeed, two other generic producers predicted Barr’s imminent victory
114
and joined the suit, agreeing to share litigation costs. Nevertheless, in exchange
for annual payments totaling $398.1 million, the generic producers dropped the
challenge to Bayer’s patent and abandoned their efforts to manufacture a generic

105. See Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 919 (1985) (“[N]o direct sources for the legislative
history of the Cartwright Act exist . . . .”); id. at 920–921 (“First, as shown by the plain meaning of the statutory
language, the evident implication of such language, and the manifest purpose of the Act, the Legislature
intended to strike as broadly as it could in the Cartwright Act.”).
106. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16720.
107. See In re Cipro Cases I & II, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165, 175 (Ct. App. 2011) (“Since the Cartwright Act
and the federal Sherman Act share similar language and objectives, California courts often look to federal
precedents under the Sherman Act for guidance.”).
108. Id.
109. See e.g. Union Carbide Corp. v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 36 Cal. 3d 15, 19–20 (1984)
(ruling that indirect purchasers may bring alleged antitrust violations, in contrast to Sherman Act’s restriction of
such claims under the Illinois Brick doctrine).
110. See In re Cipro Cases I & II, No. S198616 (Cal. Feb. 15, 2012) (granting petition for review of
Cartwright Act challenge to reverse-payment agreement).
111. Brief of Appellants, supra note 8, at 8–9.
112. Id. at 9.
113. Id. at 11 (“Barr’s evidence of inequitable conduct was persuasive.”). Barr introduced evidence that
Bayer’s German patent admitted the company knew the patent constituted prior art when filed in Germany. Id.
Bayer mounted an insanity claim against the 72 year old agent in an attempt to discredit his claim. Id. at 11–12.
In challenges before the U.S. Trademark and Patent Office, Bayer made related arguments, discrediting the
agents testimony by noting that had retired 10 years before being deposed, and “had a cerebral hemorrhage after
he retired which affected his memory and overall health.” Id. at 12.
114. Id. at 13.
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alternative. Challenges to the agreement brought under the Cartwright Act
focused on the injury to California consumers resulting from unavailable lower116
cost generics.
1. Superior Court Interpretation
The trial court reasoned that no Cartwright Act violation had occurred
because the Cipro agreements did not restrict competition beyond the ordinary
117
scope of the patent. In doing so, the trial court adopted the same reasoning
employed by the Second Circuit to nearly immunize reverse-payment
118
agreements. The court’s ruling did not extensively analyze the plaintiffs’ claims
under the rule of reason or the per se rule, holding that the plaintiffs’ claim failed
119
as a matter of law because of the exclusionary nature of the Cipro patent.
2. Court of Appeal Interpretation
On appeal, plaintiffs claimed the trial court erred by failing to rule that the
120
Cipro agreements constituted a per se violation of the Cartwright Act. The
appellate court was unconvinced and affirmed the decision of the superior
121
court. As in many of the circuit court cases that preceded the Actavis
122
decision, the court perceived a fundamental conflict between patent and
123
antitrust law as applied to reverse-payment agreements. The court remarked:
“[c]onsidering the important public policies underlying patent law . . . and
favoring the settlement of patent litigation . . . and the fact that the Cipro
agreements did not restrain competition outside the exclusionary zone of the . . .

115. Id. at 17–18. The payments included “an initial payment of $49.1 million and quarterly cash
payments until December 2003.” Id. at 18.
116. Brief of Appellants, supra note 8, at 2 (The plaintiffs in the Cipro action were a “certified class of
‘hundreds of thousands’ of California consumers and third-party payor insurers . . . .”). The right of third-party
indirect purchasers to join in an antitrust suit is unique to the Cartwright Act and unavailable for Sherman Act
challenges under the Illinois Brick doctrine. See infra, note 175–179 and accompanying text.
117. Coordination Proceeding Cipro Cases I & II, No. JCCP4154, 2009 WL 2700124 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Aug. 21, 2009).
118. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 216 (2nd Cir. 2006) (declining to
undertake antitrust scrutiny of reverse-payment agreements unless the restrictions involved exceed the
exclusionary scope of the patent).
119. See In re Cipro Cases I & II, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165, 184 (Ct. App. 2011) (“[B]ecause a patent is
presumed to be valid and gives the patent holder the right to exclude others from marketing the patented
invention, a settlement of patent infringement litigation ‘is not unlawful if it serves to protect that to which the
patent holder is legally entitled . . . .’”).
120. Id. at 169.
121. Id. at 184. The court endorsed the reasoning of the federal courts as well. Id.
122. E.g. FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1306 (11th Cir. 2012); In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 544 F.3d 1323, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Tamoxifen
Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187, 203 (2nd Cir. 2006).
123. In re Cipro Cases I & II, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165, 184 (Ct. App. 2011).
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patent, we cannot view the Cipro agreements as lacking any redeeming virtue.”
While its opinion lacks a detailed analysis of the Cartwright Act, the court held
that reverse-payment agreements that do not exclude competition beyond the
125
scope of the patent violate neither the per se rule nor the rule of reason.
3. California Supreme Court Certiorari
The California Supreme Court granted certiorari following the court of
126
appeal’s rejection of the Cartwright Act claim. However, the plaintiffs reached
a settlement agreement with some of the defendants before arguments took
127
place. The court approved the settlement and requested supplemental briefing
to consider the impact of the Actavis decision before the continuation of litigation
128
against remaining defendants.
That the California Supreme Court granted certiorari demonstrates the
important legal issues raised under the Cartwright Act by reverse-payment
settlements. The absence of generic alternatives eliminates the potential for
consumer savings, and the cost to Californians in particular represents a
129
substantial portion of any harm rendered.
VII. THE PATENT PROBLEM: POLICY CONCERNS OF IMMUNIZING PATENTS FROM
ANTITRUST SCRUTINY
130

Litigation plays an important role in determining the validity of patents.
Obtaining a patent is a relatively low-threshold achievement, usually involving
some hours of review with limited resources by the Patent Office, which then
131
makes a determination of novelty. The Court has itself referred to patents as “a
legal conclusion reached by the Patent Office. . . . predicated on factors as to
132
which reasonable men can differ widely.” In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, the Court
recognized these difficulties by requiring parties to defend the Patent Office’s
133
judgment in court. Today, the Patent Office reviews exponentially more

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Cipro, JOSEPH SAVERI LAW FIRM, http://saverilawfirm.com/our-cases/cipro-case/ (last visited
March 20, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See Letter Brief of Attorney General, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that “California citizens paid $21.7
billion for [prescription] drugs in 2010”). The cost of reverse-payment agreements to Californians is estimated
at $4.2 billion over 10 years. Id. at 3.
130. See Brief of Law, Economics, and Business Professors, supra note 15, at 15.
131. Id. (“Such a judgment comes after limited scrutiny with examiners having, on average, less than 20
hours to read an application, search for prior art, evaluate patentability, and reach and write up conclusions.”).
132. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
133. Id.
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applications—about 500,000 a year total—than it did fifty years ago when Lear
134
was decided. The Supreme Court’s reasoning, therefore, is of greater
importance today than ever before.
Due to the patent evaluation process, invalid patents are certain to exist. In
fact, studies have consistently shown that more than 40% of patents granted are
135
actually invalid. The adversarial role of litigation in determining the validity of
a patent is therefore of heightened importance; courts have greater resources at
their disposal to make an informed decision about patent validity, including
briefs, testimony, and any other relevant materials with which a party might
136
make their case. Effectively immunizing patents from antitrust scrutiny, as
lower courts have done, ignores the realities of the patent approval process and
undermines the ability to ensure that only novel materials and processes are
protected.
In the pharmaceutical industry, the need for judicial scrutiny of patents is
137
even greater. An FTC study found that courts held 73% of brand name patents
invalid following generic challenges under Hatch-Waxman between 1992 and
138
2002. That number confirms that relying merely on the Patent Office’s
139
judgment is not an effective determination of a patent’s validity. Further, it
highlights the questionable nature of some patents in the pharmaceutical industry,
as producers have attempted to protect non-active ingredients, “methods of use,”
140
and other less innovative processes. For example, at the heart of the dispute in
141
Actavis was a patent for synthetic testosterone. The active ingredient in that
patented substance was first created in the early twentieth century, and had been
142
available in various drugs for more than fifty years. The patent did not cover
134. Brief of Law, Economics, and Business Professors, supra note 15, at 17.
135. Brief of Law, Economics, and Business Professors, supra note 15, at 15–16; See John R. Allison &
Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA. Q.J. 185, 205 (1998)
(finding in a study of 300 patent validity decisions that patents were found to be invalid in 46% of cases).
136. See April 2014 Patents Data, at a Glance, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
www.ustpo.com/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml (last visited May 20, 2014, 1:39AM) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (indicating that as of April 2014, the Patent Office had 619,204 unexamined patent
applications pending review, with hundreds of thousands of applications continuing to pour in to the Patent
Office, and a staff of only around 8,000 patent examiners). Legal scholarship has been critical of the Patent
Office’s resources and its limited ability to handle the evolving technological developments that utilize patents.
Kevin Mack, Reforming Inequitable Conduct to Improve Patent Quality: Cleansing Unclean Hands, 21
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147 (2006).
137. See Brief of Law, Economics, and Business Professors, supra note 15, at 16 (indicating that the
problem of invalid patents is worse in the pharmaceutical industry than elsewhere) .
138. FTC REVERSE-PAYMENT STUDY, supra note 4, at 3.
139. See id. (indicating that the Patent Office is approving invalid pharmaceutical patents at a high rate).
140. See Brief of Law, Economics, and Business Professors, supra note 15, at 19. (“Those patents are less
innovative (and so less likely to be valid) and easier to avoid. Asserting them accordingly bears more potential
for anticompetitive mischief.”).
141. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013) (describing the subject of the challenge,
Androgel®).
142. See Brief of Law, Economics, and Business Professors, supra note 15, at 20 (“The active ingredient,
synthetic testosterone, was artificially synthesized in 1935 and has been available in drug products since the
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the ingredient, however, but instead protected “the use of a particular gel
143
formulation containing ingredients in certain amounts.”
Unfortunately, the regulatory framework of the Hatch-Waxman Act allows
144
these questionable patents to thwart potential competition. The patenting of
inactive ingredients and methods of delivery blocks generic manufacturers from
producing cheaper alternatives for consumers when the patent on an active
145
ingredient has run out. Instead, it forces generic manufacturers to initiate a
146
Paragraph IV legal challenge to the brand name producer’s patent. Coupled
with the “bottlenecking” of future challenges, this exploitation of the patent
process stymies competition and derails congressional efforts to encourage
147
greater competition from generic producers.
In evaluating reverse-payment agreements, lower courts should consider the
policy implications of immunizing such agreements from antitrust scrutiny,
especially in light of generic-friendly legislation like the Hatch-Waxman Act. As
Justice Breyer opined in Actavis, “it would be incongruous to determine antitrust
legality by measuring the settlement’s anticompetitive effects solely against
patent law policy, rather than by measuring them against procompetitive antitrust
148
policies as well.” The Actavis decision rejected the circuit courts’ reasoning,
which would have allowed the exploitation of potentially invalid patents to
149
continue. Courts in California should employ a similar shift in reasoning.
VIII. THE SUPREME COURT’S IMPACT ON REVERSE-PAYMENT LEGALITY IN
CALIFORNIA
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis represents a decisive
endorsement of the use of antitrust principles to resolve reverse-payment

1950s.”).
143. Id.
144. For a review of the Hatch-Waxman Act, designed to incentivize and facilitate the market entry of
generic drugs, see supra Part II.
145. See Brief of Law, Economics, and Business Professors, supra note 15, at 19.
(“Drug companies, however, are increasingly patenting and asserting ancillary, non-active
ingredients, like a formulation, dissolution profile, or method of use. . . . Asserting them accordingly
bears more potential for anticompetitive mischief. For under the regulatory regime, even a weak
patent or one on a minor advance like a method of delivery can prevent market entry by the
generic.”).
146. For a description of the types of challenges available to generic manufacturers under the HatchWaxman Act, see supra Part II.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 51–56 (describing the ways that brand name drug manufacturers
frustrate the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act). Many of the incentives for generic entry under the HatchWaxman Act are available only to first-filer drug manufacturers. Id. Future challengers must wait until the
resolution of the initial generic challenge against a brand name producer. Id.; see also FTC REVERSE-PAYMENT
STUDY, supra note 4, at 3.
148. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013).
149. Id. (“[T]his Court has indicated that patent and antitrust policies are both relevant in determining the
‘scope of the patent monopoly’—and consequently antitrust law immunity—that is conferred by a patent.”).
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agreement litigation under the Sherman Act. The Court’s opinion rejects the
idea that the settlements are acceptable so long as they do not restrict competition
151
beyond the scope of the patent. The reasoning rejected by the Court effectively
prevents any antitrust scrutiny because the patent is viewed as a legal instrument
152
allowing restrictions on competition. Indeed, the Court remarked that the
Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning would have “provide[d] near-automatic antitrust
153
immunity to reverse-payment settlements.”
In rejecting the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit, the Court indirectly
rejected the reasoning of the lower courts in California that reviewed the Cipro
154
agreements. The trial court and court of appeal that considered the Cipro cases
specifically cited reasoning from the Second, Sixth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuit
155
Courts that rejected antitrust challenges to reverse-payment settlements. The
trial court remarked that “[t]he federal court cases dealing generally with Hatch
Waxman settlements, and specifically with this agreement, have uniformly held
156
that settlements within the scope of the patent do not violate antitrust laws.”
The court of appeal affirmed, noting that much of the federal Sherman Act
interpretation was reasonable and applicable to similar challenges under the
157
Cartwright Act.
This pronounced reliance on the Sherman Act cases by lower courts in
California suggests that any change at the federal level might impact the
reasoning applied in Cartwright Act challenges as well. The federal Sherman Act
decisions were important to the California court holdings given the absence of
158
Cartwright Act precedent on reverse-payment settlements.

150. See id. at 2237 (“In sum, a reverse payment, where large and unjustified, can bring with it the risk of
significant anticompetitive effects . . . .”).
151. Id. (“In our view, these considerations, taken together, outweigh the single strong consideration—the
desirability of settlements—that led the Eleventh Circuit to provide near-automatic antitrust immunity to
reverse payment settlements.”).
152. See FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (2012) (“[A] reverse payment
settlement is immune from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the
exclusionary potential of the patent.”).
153. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
154. See In re Cipro Cases I & II, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165 (Ct. App. 2011); Coordination Proceeding Cipro
Cases I & II, No. JCCP4154, 2009 WL 2700124 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2009).
155. Coordination Proceeding Cipro Cases I & II, No. JCCP4154, 2009 WL 2700124 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Aug. 21, 2009).
156. Id.
157. In re Cipro Cases I & II, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165, 184 (Ct. App. 2011) (“We find the reasoning of the
federal cases discussed above regarding the legality of settlements of Hatch–Waxman patent litigation to be
sound and applicable to plaintiffs’ cause of action under the Cartwright Act.”).
158. Coordination Proceeding Cipro Cases I & II, No. JCCP4154, 2009 WL 2700124 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Aug. 21, 2009); In re Cipro Cases I & II, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165, 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th, 2011). Indeed, there
was very little consideration of the Cartwright Act itself—either its text or legislative history or judicial
interpretation. Id.
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The U.S. Supreme Court discussed many of the California court’s concerns
159
regarding applying antitrust scrutiny to reverse-payment settlements. The
California courts, relying on the Eleventh Circuit, emphasized the favorability of
settling disputes and expressed concern for the chilling effect on settlements in
patent-infringement cases should the agreements be subject to antitrust
160
scrutiny. In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court highlighted the potential for
consumer harm should reverse-payment settlements be immunized from
161
scrutiny, finding that concerns of a chilling effect should not prohibit an inquiry
that was “likely to prove more feasible administratively than the Eleventh Circuit
162
believed.”
This Comment proposes that California courts should follow the approach of
the U.S. Supreme Court by denouncing the exclusionary scope test adopted by
lower courts and embracing antitrust scrutiny of reverse-payment agreements. On
order from the California Supreme Court, reevaluation of the Cipro cases under
163
the Cartwright Act must consider the Actavis decision.
The case for reevaluation extends beyond the change in relied-upon federal
interpretation. Many Californian consumers continue to lack a sufficient remedy
164
under the Sherman Act. Under the Illinois Brick doctrine, consumers who do
not purchase a product directly from the alleged antitrust violator cannot bring a
165
Sherman Act claim. In the context of reverse-payment agreements, an indirect
purchaser might be any consumer who purchased their medication from a
hospital or doctor’s office—most people do not purchase their prescriptions
166
directly from the producers. Therefore, under the doctrine, many California
consumers cannot bring Sherman Act claims against the drug producers who
enter into reverse-payment agreements; they must instead rely on government
167
enforcement. The Illinois Brick Court reasoned that the administrative

159. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
160. See In re Cipro Cases I & II, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165, 185 (Ct. App. 2011) (“[A] rule prohibiting
[reverse-payment agreements] could harm competition by reducing the incentive to challenge patents by
reducing the challenger’s settlement options in a suit for infringement.”).
161. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2226 (highlighting the “potential for genuine adverse effects on competition”
in rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s decision).
162. Id. at 2236–37 (“In a word, the size of the unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable
surrogate for a patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a detailed exploration of the validity of
the patent itself.”).
163. In re Cipro Cases I & II, No. S198616 (Cal. Feb. 15, 2012) (granting petition for review of
Cartwright Act challenge to reverse-payment agreement). “The parties are directed to submit simultaneous
supplemental letter briefs discussing the relevance of FTC v. Actavis, Inc.” Id.
164. See Letter Brief of Attorney General, supra note 2, at 2 (“[B]ecause of the Illinois Brick doctrine,
federal antitrust law provides no relief to California consumers injured by antitrust violations if they did not
purchase the affected goods directly from the antitrust violators.”).
165. Id.; Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728 (1977).
166. See Letter Brief of Attorney General, supra note 2, at 2 (“[F]ederal antitrust law provides no relief to
California consumers injured by antitrust violations if they did not purchase the affected goods directly from the
antitrust violators.”).
167. Id.
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difficulties in assessing the impact of antitrust violations throughout the market
chain, as well as a defendant’s potential exposure to multiple liabilities, justified
168
an outright ban on indirect purchaser claims. Many states, including California,
169
reject the Illinois Brick doctrine in interpreting their own antitrust laws.
Allowing reverse-payment challenges to proceed under the Cartwright Act is
170
therefore a crucial tool in promoting consumer welfare. Without a Cartwright
Act remedy, California consumers will not be able to bring antitrust claims
171
against producers who enter into reverse-payment agreements.
IX. THE CASE FOR REVERSE-PAYMENT EVALUATION UNDER THE PER SE RULE
IN CARTWRIGHT ACT CHALLENGES
The case for antitrust scrutiny of reverse-payment settlements under the
Cartwright Act is compelling: the plain language of the Act and recent changes in
Sherman Act interpretation suggest that the agreements should not be immunized
172
from inquiry. However, courts must still determine the level of review to
173
undertake in such cases. This Comment proposes that the per se rule is the
optimum lens with which to analyze reverse-payment agreements. In the
alternative, the quick-look approach could also serve as an acceptable standard of
review should the California Supreme Court decline to embrace a per se ban..
A. The Agreements Violate the Plain Language of the Act
The decisive starting point in antitrust analysis mirrors that of all legal
174
analysis—to look first at the text itself. The Cartwright Act is broadly
constructed, mandating that “every trust is unlawful, against public policy and
175
void.” The Act enumerates several definitions of trusts, many of which

168. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 741. The Court refused “to ignore the burdens that such an attempt would
impose on the effective enforcement of the antitrust laws.” Id. The potential itself, without such a guarantee,
was enough to justify the ban. Id. at 740. The Court feared allowing indirect purchasers “would transform
treble-damages actions into massive multiparty litigations involving many levels of distribution and including
large classes of ultimate consumers remote from the defendant.” Id..
169. Letter Brief of Attorney General, supra note 2, at 2; see Union Carbide Corp. v. Superior Court of
San Francisco, 36 Cal. 3d 15, 19–20 (1984) (adopting the Illinois Brick dissent’s position to allow indirect
purchaser claims under the Cartwright Act).
170. Letter Brief of Attorney General, supra note 2 at 2.
171. Id.
172. See supra Part VIII (describing the effect of the Supreme Court’s Actavis decision).
173. See Coordination Proceeding Cipro Cases I & II, No. JCCP4154, 2009 WL 2700124 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Aug. 21, 2009) (“Thus, the Court turns to federal decisions concerning the Sherman Act as persuasive authority
to guide its decision.”).
174. See Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 917 (1985) (analyzing the plain language of the
Cartwright Act prior to any further discussion). The court began its analysis with the text of the Cartwright Act,
noting that “the statute is comprehensive in its attack on threats to competition, and thereby implies that its
coverage extends to all economic combinations, regardless of the nature . . . .” Id. at 917.
175. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16726 (West 2008); see Cianci, 40 Cal.3d at 918 (“The Act is broad in
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176

implicate reverse-payment agreements. The California lower courts, in holding
that the agreements are valid if they are within the exclusionary scope of the
177
patent, did not undertake a textual analysis of the Act.
Among the enumerated listing of restricted trusts, the Cartwright Act
prohibits those that “limit or reduce the production, or increase the price of
178
merchandise or any commodity.” Similarly, restricted trusts include those that
“prevent competition in manufacturing, making, transportation, sale or purchase
179
of merchandise, produce or of any commodity.” Reverse-payment agreements
180
will always fit within these definitions of restricted trusts. The agreements
involve payments from one manufacturer to another to limit production of a
181
cheaper alternative. Therefore, these agreements will always limit production
by restricting the generic drug from entering the market, thereby increasing costs
182
to the consumer. Competition is always impacted negatively, because these
183
cheaper drugs no longer compete with brand name alternatives. These textual
considerations were not considered by the Supreme Court because the Sherman
184
Act does not offer the same language.
B. The Extraordinarily Anticompetitive Nature of the Agreements Requires
Application of the ‘Per Se’ Rule
Beyond violating the plain language of the Cartwright Act, reverse-payment
agreements are anticompetitive enough to warrant little evaluation by courts

scope: ‘[it] is “couched in . . . comprehensive language” and “forbids combinations of the kind described with
respect to every type of business.”’”).
176. See BUS. & PROF. § 16720(a) (“To create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce.”); id.
§ 16720(b) (“To limit or reduce the production, or increase the price of merchandise or of any commodity.”); id.
§ 16720(c) (“To prevent competition in manufacturing, making, transportation, sale or purchase of
merchandise, produce or any commodity.”).
177. In re Cipro Cases I & II, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165, 184 (Ct. App. 2011); see Letter Brief of Attorney
General, supra note 2, at 4 (“The court below erred by failing to engage in any part of this prescribed analysis
of our state antitrust law when reviewing reverse-payment agreements.”).
178. BUS. & PROF. § 16720(b).
179. BUS. & PROF. § 16720(c).
180. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013) (Justice Breyer delivered the Court’s opinion
with the following opening statement, describing the typical reverse-payment scenario: “Company A sues
Company B for patent infringement. The two companies settle under terms that require (1) Company B, the
claimed infringer, not to produce the patented product until the patent’s term expires, and (2) Company A, the
patentee, to pay B many millions of dollars.”).
181. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 8, at 25 (“It is hard to imagine a more blatantly illegal or
pernicious arrangement than a monopolist’s payment to a competitor to stay out of its market.”).
182. See FTC REVERSE-PAYMENT STUDY, supra note 4, at 3. In describing the payments, the FTC notes
that “[c]onsumers lose, however: they miss out on generic prices that can be as much as 90 percent less than
brand prices.” Id. at 1.
183. Id.; See Leibowitz, supra note 13, at 3 (“Now, as most of you already know, when multiple generics
are on the market, the price for the generic version can drop more than 90 percent below the price of the
branded product, which means enormous savings for Americans.”).
184. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
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under the rule of reason. As the plaintiffs in the Cipro action have remarked, “[i]t
is hard to imagine a more blatantly illegal or pernicious arrangement than a
185
monopolist’s payment to a competitor to stay out of its market.” The impact of
186
reverse-payment agreements on the market for a drug is immediate. The
opportunity for pro-competitive justifications and the time consumed in
undertaking a rule-of-reason analysis, as well as the high cost of litigation and
discovery to prove anti-competitiveness, thereby might prove detrimental to
consumer welfare in contradiction to antitrust goals, making the per se rule more
187
appropriate.
Reverse-payment agreements are not so different from other practices that
188
courts consider per se violations of the Cartwright Act. In fact, the Act already
189
prohibits traditional covenants not to compete. The presence of a patent should
not dissuade courts from noting the basic invalidity of agreements like the one
between Bayer and Barr in which a competitor may choose to withdraw their
190
product in exchange for large payments. These reverse-payment agreements are
not readily distinguishable from covenants not to compete or market-division
191
agreements. Courts considering application of the per se rule should rely on
prior interpretation of these agreements.
C. Use of the Rule of Reason Contravenes Antitrust Goals
In addition to the Cartwright Act’s plain language, its foundational goals of
192
consumer welfare and protection also compel application of the per se rule. The
court of appeal emphasized that “public policy favoring the settlement of
193
disputes was an important factor in its analysis.” But, as the California
Supreme Court has reiterated, “[c]onsumer welfare is a principal, if not the sole,

185. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 8, at 25.
186. See FTC Statement, supra note 53, at 5 (“Typically, the first generic sells at a 20 percent discount
off the branded price, and a discount of as much as 85 percent is common in a mature generic market with
multiple generic entrants.”).
187. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 56, at 255 (3d ed. 2005); Leibowitz, supra note 13, at 4 (noting the
FTC’s prioritization of litigating reverse-payment agreements).
188. Brief of Appellants, supra note 8, at 25 (drawing analogies between reverse-payment agreements
and more traditional market division or consumer allocation agreements, which effectively prevent producers
from competing directly in the same geographic area). “It has long been considered a per se violation of
California and federal antitrust law for one company to pay a competitor to stay out of a market.” Letter Brief of
Attorney General, supra note 2, at 3.
189. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16720(c) (West 2008).
190. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 8, at 26 (“Under settled California law, the reverse payment from
Bayer to Barr violates the Cartwright Act per se because it secured an agreement not to compete and allocated
the market to Bayer in exchange for monopoly profits.”).
191. See Brief of Law, Economics, and Business Professors, supra note 15, at 13 (“Settlements by which
brands pay generics not to enter the market pose dangers analogous to territorial market allocation.”).
192. Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 918–919 (1985).
193. In re Cipro Cases I & II, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165, 177 (Ct. App. 2011).
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194

goal of antitrust laws.” One should question whether a policy that favors
settlement of disputes lends itself to improve consumer welfare. Interpretation of
the law and its application in various contexts should focus primarily on
promoting consumer welfare and fair competition practices, as opposed to
195
concerns for a producer’s patent. A court focusing on promoting consumer
196
welfare should dismiss these agreements as invalid with little consideration. A
single reverse-payment agreement immediately results in higher drug costs and
197
lower competition. Previous courts have addressed conflicting concerns in
198
addition to consumer welfare, such as the relevance of valid patents. Yet under
antitrust analysis, consumer welfare and potential for detriment should be the
199
focus of the litigation. A removal of secondary considerations, like the presence
of patents, should suggest to courts that application of the per se rule is the most
practical standard of review in light of antitrust concerns.
X. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: QUICK-LOOK ANALYSIS IN LIEU OF
TRADITIONAL APPLICATION OF THE RULE-OF-REASON
As FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez has remarked, even “[a] single
anticompetitive agreement can easily increase prescription drug costs by many
200
millions of dollars.” The application of the per se rule to reverse-payment
201
agreements represents the most appropriate framework for judicial inquiry.
Indeed, with over 70% of brand name patents held invalid following generic
challenges, a sweeping judicial condemnation of reverse-payment agreements
202
seems appropriate.
Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court may hesitate to apply the per se
rule in this context. Sherman Act jurisprudence is not controlling, but it remains

194. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 918.
195. See FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013) (“In our view, however, reverse payment
settlements such as the agreement alleged in the complaint before us can sometimes violate the antitrust laws.
We consequently hold that the Eleventh Circuit should have allowed the FTC’s lawsuit to proceed.”).
196. See FTC REVERSE-PAYMENT STUDY, supra note 4, at 8 (indicating that generic drugs often cost 85%
less than brand name alternatives, resulting in significant benefit to the consumer); Cianci, 40 Cal.3d at 918
(observing that consumer welfare is the focus of antitrust laws).
197. FTC Statement, supra note 53, at 12.
198. FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, 677 F.3d 1298, 1306 (11th Cir. 2012) (discussing the competing
interests of precedent, “pro-exclusivity” patent law, and “pro-competitve” antitrust law); In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 544 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (considering whether the validity of a
patent is relevant to an antitrust claim); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187, 203 (2nd
Cir. 2006) (admitting that the policy of furthering settlement of litigation may not align with policies benefitting
the consumer).
199. Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 918.
200. See FTC Statement, supra note 53, at 12.
201. See supra Part IX.
202. See FTC REVERSE-PAYMENT STUDY, supra note 4, at 3 (“In 2002, the FTC issued a study showing
that generics prevailed in 73% of the patent litigation ultimately resolved by a court decision between 1992 and
June 2002.”).
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203

persuasive. The lack of Sherman Act decisions applying the per se rule might
compel the court to be more cautious in imposing a near-sweeping ban on the
agreements. Both the trial court and the court of appeal relied heavily on federal
interpretation in determining the legality of agreements under the Cartwright
204
Act. Even though Sherman Act decisional law is merely persuasive, it carries
significant weight within California.
The Actavis decision, however, came down as plaintiffs in the Cipro action
205
appealed to the California Supreme Court. It renders obsolete the lower court’s
206
reliance on federal interpretation. If the California Supreme Court declines to
adopt the per se approach, then it should adopt a quick-look analysis instead.
Such an application, urged by the FTC in the Actavis case, would be appropriate
207
in the context of reverse-payment agreements under the Cartwright Act. As the
U.S. Supreme Court remarked, quick-look analysis is appropriate where “an
observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude
that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on
208
customers and markets.” Indeed, the anticompetitive impact from a bar to
209
generic market entry is immediate and obvious. This impact conforms to the
210
Court’s view of appropriate quick-look application.
If applying the quick-look analysis, the California Supreme Court would
place the burden of proof on the brand name defendants, requiring them to
211
affirmatively demonstrate the pro-competitive nature of their agreements. This
scenario is preferable to the rule of reason, which leaves to consumer plaintiffs
212
the responsibility of mounting more complex challenges to the agreements.
From a practical perspective, the defendants in any reverse-payment action will
more likely possess the relevant information for a proper antitrust analysis. From
a policy standpoint, courts should not place the burden of proof on injured

203. See Coordination Proceeding Cipro Cases I & II, No. JCCP4154, 2009 WL 2700124 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Aug. 21, 2009) (“Thus, the Court turns to federal decisions concerning the Sherman Act as persuasive authority
to guide its decision”).
204. See supra Part VI.B.1-2.
205. See In re Cipro Cases I & II, No. S198616 (Cal. Feb. 15, 2012) (granting petition for review of
Cartwright Act challenge to reverse-payment agreement).
206. In re Cipro Cases I & II, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165 (Ct. App. 2011); Coordination Proceeding Cipro
Cases I & II, No. JCCP4154, 2009 WL 2700124 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2009).
207. FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013).
208. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
209. Brief of Appellants, supra note 8, at 1 (“It would be hard to design a more anticompetitive, more
unlawful, or more harmful restraint of trade than paying a potential competitor to stay out of the market.”).
210. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 770.
211. Oliver, supra note 26, at 40 (“The burden of production . . . shifts to the defendant to rebut the
plaintiff’s showing. It may do so by demonstrating that the restraint has a plausible procompetitive justification.
If the defendant does so, a full rule of reason analysis must be undertaken.”).
212. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 56, at 257 (saying that the per se rule requires less inquiry into
questionable practices before determining legality).
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consumers. Nevertheless, this application remains a secondary preference; the
per se rule is superior from both a policy and an administrative standpoint.
XI. CONCLUSION
Even in of light Bayer and Barr’s settlement with California plaintiffs, the
question of the legality of reverse-payment agreements under the Cartwright Act
will eventually be addressed by either the legislature or the California Supreme
Court. Prior California interpretation has followed that of early federal cases in
effectively immunizing reverse-payment agreements from scrutiny due to patent
213
concerns. As a result, producers of brand name and generic drugs may continue
to collude to keep cost-effective medications off the market. While brand name
producers maintain their patent monopolies, and generic manufacturers receive a
214
hefty share of the profits, consumers are left to pay the price. However, the
renewal of antitrust interest in reverse-payment agreements by the U.S. Supreme
215
Court’s Actavis decision should signal a similar renewal in California. The
Cartwright Act’s language and intent compels application of the per se rule to
216
these highly consumer-unfavorable agreements.

213. Coordination Proceeding Cipro Cases I & II, No. JCCP4154, 2009 WL 2700124 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Aug. 21, 2009); In re Cipro Cases I & II, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165, 184 (Ct. App. 2011).
214. Letter Brief of Attorney General, supra note 2, at 3 (indicating that in California, that price was at
least $4.2 billion over 10 years). As use of prescription drugs continually rises, one can infer the cost of reverse
payments will rise. See id. at 2 (indicating that prescription drug costs continue to increase every year).
215. FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2233 (2013).
216. See supra Part IX.
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